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Abstract: We find that the location of corporate headquarters significantly affects the firm’s bondholders. 
Similar to Loughran and Schultz (2006) and others, who show that investors are better able to obtain 
information on nearby companies, we look at firms located in large metropolitan cities, small cities, and 
rural areas and find that firms located in remote rural areas exhibit significantly higher costs of debt 
capital (of up to 65 basis points) in comparison to their urban counterparts. Unlike other studies that 
focus on the role of information asymmetries in the local bias of investors and decision makers, we are 
able to show that firms in remote areas experience greater costs of debt capital primarily because of a 
greater difficulty of monitoring their activities. We find that the adverse impact of bad corporate 
governance on bondholders is magnified in geographically remote firms, primarily because geographic 
distance reduces the effectiveness of external monitoring. Consistent with that, we show that in the 
private placement market, where firms are closely monitored by institutional investors, location plays no 
role in explaining the cross-sectional variation in the cost of debt capital across companies. We also find 
that the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which brought about regulatory improvements in 
monitoring and governance, significantly reduced the agency costs of debt in rural firms. Taken together, 
our results indicate that the firm’s information environment interacts with the impact of corporate 
governance, particularly affecting the effectiveness of external monitoring in alleviating agency problems 
between insiders and debt holders. 
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Does Geography Matter to Bondholders? 
 
1. Introduction 
A recent and growing body of literature documents the importance of geographic location in affecting 
investor behavior and corporate decision-making. Proximity of the firm’s headquarters to investors, 
corporate divisions, banks, analysts and market makers, is associated with a more efficient information 
flow reflected in higher investor returns (Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005), resolution of information 
problems in bank lending (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005), greater employee 
friendliness (Landier, Nair, Wulf, 2006), and more accurate earnings forecasts by analysts (Malloy 2005).  
Yet surprisingly, although debt is the primary source of external financing for most firms, the impact of 
geography on bondholders has received no attention.   
In a recent study, Loughran and Schultz (2006) find that rural firms, having a smaller base of 
close by investors and financial intermediaries, suffer from more information asymmetry problems than 
their urban counterparts. The authors show that as a result, these rural less visible firms are more likely to 
hold a greater proportion of debt in their capital structure in comparison to similar urban companies. 
These external financing differences between rural and urban firms have important implications for debt 
holders. The goal of this study is to take the Loughran and Schultz study one step further and examine 
whether the geographic proximity of a firm’s headquarters to its investors and financial intermediaries 
affects the firm’s cost of debt capital, proxied by its bond at-issue yield spreads.  We base our study on 
the idea that a firm’s geographical proximity to a large base of investors reduces the cost of understanding 
and monitoring both the firm’s business and the ability and behavior of its management, and is therefore 
priced accordingly by debt holders. When bondholders perceive corporate information to be more 
difficult to obtain and monitor, they assign firms a higher likelihood of withholding value relevant 
unfavorable information, and as a result, charge a higher risk premium.  
Based on Loughran and Schultz (2006), we classify urban firms as those located in one of the ten 
largest metropolitan areas in the United States, rural firms as those located at least 100 miles away from 
the center of any metropolitan area of 1 million or more people as defined by the 2000 census, and small 
city firms as a control group of companies located in all other areas. Using the Securities Data   2
Corporation (SDC) New Issues database to extract bond issuance data during the time period 1990-2004, 
we find that the difference in the bond at-issue yield spreads between rural and urban firms can be as high 
as 65 basis points. The existence of a statistically significant spread differential between rural and urban 
companies is robust to a host of endogeneity and sensitivity tests, including alternative measures of 
geographic location as well as sample selection criteria, such as differences in size, industry, listing 
location, bond rating quality, bond maturity and analyst coverage.  
Our Study suggests two explanations as to why rural firms exhibit significantly higher costs of 
debt capital in comparison to urban companies. First, information quality may be compromised when the 
decision maker is further away from financial intermediates like banks, analysts and large institutional 
investors who are associated with reducing information asymmetries (e.g., Malloy, 2005; Coval and 
Moskovitz, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 1999).  Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that geographic 
proximity affects the flow of soft information because it enables more frequent interaction and better 
personal acquaintance with firm managers within social settings outside work, fostering understanding 
and creating inside knowledge. If on average, the physical access to rural firms by their financial 
intermediaries is more difficult, then acquiring soft information, as opposed to hard information, becomes 
increasingly costly. In the words of Loughran and Schultz (2006): “Is a firm located in urban Los 
Angeles, or one located in rural Bismarck, North Dakota farther from institutional investors in New York 
City? Measured in miles, the company in Los Angeles is much farther away. But, it is also much easier 
for the institutional investor to reach. There are numerous direct flights from New York to Los Angeles 
every day. Getting to Bismarck is difficult, and once there, the analyst is almost certainly stuck for the 
night”.   
Since bondholders are mainly concerned with the default risk of the firm, and correspondingly, its 
ability to make scheduled interest and principle payments over the life of the bond, better access to 
information should signal a higher probability of payment over the life of the bond and better chances to 
reveal unfavorable information that might increase the default risk of the company (Sengupta 1998). As a 
result, bondholders take into consideration the information set of the company when assessing its 
information risk and incorporate it into their required at-issue yields.     3
We construct information proxies based on the analyst following of the firm. Mansi, Maxwell and 
Miller (2004), Sengupta (1998) and others find that analyst coverage and disclosure are inversely related 
to the firm’s cost of debt capital. We find that although the information flow contained in analyst 
following reduces the spread differential between rural and urban companies, its effect is independent of 
whether the firm receives analyst coverage or not. Therefore, while we find that the information 
environment of the firm affects its bondholders, the significant impact of geographic location on the 
firm’s cost of debt capital cannot be fully explained by information asymmetry considerations. 
The second explanation is related to agency problems that could arise between managers and 
investors. Landier, Nair and Wulf (2006) find that decision makers in geographically dispersed firms 
make decisions that might not align with the company’s shareholders. The authors show that employee 
dismissals are less likely in less populated counties, where the manager internalizes the impact of her 
decisions on local employees, the welfare of the community, and her social standing in the area. In a 
related study, Gao, Ng and Wang (2006) find that geographically dispersed firms are worth less than 
geographically focused ones. The authors show that agency problems could lead to geographic 
expansions that provide monetary and non-monetary benefits to management that are not value 
maximizing to shareholders. They further find that as geographic dispersion complicates the 
organizational structure of the corporation, it also increases the difficulty of external monitoring by 
shareholders, which leads to greater agency problems between management and equity holders.  
There are two channels in which corporate governance quality could contribute to the higher cost 
of debt capital of rural firms compared to that of urban ones. First, it may be possible that some badly 
governed companies choose to locate themselves in rural areas. That is, managers who wish to engage in 
opportunistic behavior or live a quiet life at the expense of the firm’s capital providers may locate 
themselves in less visible rural areas. Second, it may be the case that monitoring rural companies is more 
difficult due to their distance from a large base of analysts, banks and institutional investors. For example, 
Dass and Massa (2006) find a positive association between geographic proximity and better monitoring 
by banks, resulting in reducing managerial rent appropriation and risk taking behavior. These stronger 
external monitoring mechanisms for proximate firms may result in lowering the agency costs between 
managers and debt holders in urban, more physically approachable companies.    4
We find evidence that is inconsistent with the first channel of the agency based explanation but 
consistent with the second one. That is, in general, managers do not make location decisions based on 
opportunistic interests, but location does affect external monitoring and hence agency costs of debt. Using 
the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) managerial entrenchment index as a proxy for the severity of 
agency problems between managers and investors, we find no evidence that firms with weaker 
governance are more likely to be located in rural areas. Hence, differences in corporate governance do not 
determine location choices. It seems more apparent that proximity to customers, qualified employees and 
local resources, not firm governance, are the primary determinants of location decisions. We also find that 
for both well and poorly governed firms, rural companies exhibit significantly higher costs of debt capital 
than their urban counterparts. However, within urban firms, the at-issue spread difference between well 
and poorly governed companies is much smaller than the difference in the sample of rural firms. Such 
results are consistent with the interpretation that the adverse impact of bad corporate governance on 
bondholders is magnified in geographically remote firms, because geographic distance reduces the 
effectiveness of external monitoring.  
We further explore the role of external monitoring in alleviating agency problems between firm 
insiders and bondholders by examining the at-issue yield spread differential between rural and urban 
firms in private debt markets. Consistently with Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986) and others, 
who find that private placements are particularly effective in controlling agency conflicts between 
borrowers and lenders, we find an insignificant difference between rural and urban firms’ at-issue yield 
spreads for private debt issues. This finding is consistent with stronger monitoring in private debt markets 
that serves to better align management and bondholder interests, even when the firm is located in distant 
rural areas. Hence we find that monitoring plays a significant role in explaining the cross sectional 
variation in the cost of debt capital across various locations of corporate headquarters.  
As a final robustness check, we examine the impact of new governance rules that were mandated 
by the U.S. Congress on the difference in the cost of debt between rural and urban companies. Looking at 
the time period before and after legislation of these laws offers important insights on the relation between 
location and the cost of debt capital, because it allows us to examine how location affects bondholders 
given exogenous changes in the firm’s monitoring and corporate governance environment. The main   5
changes were imposed by congress in late 2002 through the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. Generally 
speaking, SOX has established new or enhanced standards for U.S. public company boards, management 
and accounting firms, ranging from additional corporate board responsibilities, auditor independence and 
certification of financial reports by CEOs and CFOs, to enhanced criminal penalties for violation of the 
securities law, etc.
1   
We find a significant at-issue spread differential between rural and urban firms before SOX, 
which was especially large for small and poorly governed firms, but an insignificant difference following 
SOX enactment. These findings are in the same line with the interpretation that improvements in the 
monitoring environment of the firm result in alleviating the agency problem between management and 
bondholders so that firms located further away from financial intermediaries can gain from improvements 
in relevant governance attributes.
2 We also find that the issuance of bonds by small rural companies has a 
positive and significant wealth effect on stockholders before the SOX period and an insignificant effect 
thereafter. These results suggest that before SOX, shareholders in small, remote firms that were less 
visible to large sets of investors, viewed bond issuance as an effective monitoring mechanism, even 
though issuing debt by such firms was more costly. However, following the regulatory improvements in 
monitoring and disclosure brought by SOX, issuing bonds by small rural firms not only became cheaper 
but also became a “no-news” event, regardless of firm size and location.
3  
Our study has several important implications. The results suggest that the geographic location of 
corporate activities is closely related to agency problem considerations. Existing studies of corporate 
location are generally motivated by the information and familiarity advantages of investments and 
managerial decisions, associated with geographically proximate firms.
4 Our paper contributes to this 
growing literature on the importance of geography in finance and economics by taking on a different 
                                                 
1 See Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006) for a discussion of the new regulations. 
2 Our findings are also consistent with a recent study by Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) who find that adopting 
these new regulations is associated with higher firm value, which suggests that the new regulations did target 
relevant governance attributes in badly governed firms.  
3 Ge and McVay (2005) find that disclosure of internal material weaknesses is negatively related to firm size. Based 
on an analysis of firms that report internal control deficiencies under SOX section 404, De Franco, Guan and Lu 
(2005) conclude that small investors benefit more from these disclosures than large investors.  
4 For example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) demonstrate mutual fund local bias towards proximate firms due 
to better access to information, Huberman (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Zhu (2002), and others document 
similar phenomena for individual investors, and Kedia and Uysal (2006) find that acquirer returns in local 
transactions are more than twice than in non-local transactions, motivated at least partially by information issues.     6
approach. First, this is the first study that shows that the firm’s headquarters location is an important 
determinant of agency problems between firm insiders and bondholders, and that locating the firm’s 
headquarters in a rural area has significant negative implications for the firm’s cost of debt capital. The 
results also provide evidence on the interaction between corporate governance and location and its impact 
on bondholders: being located in a rural area aggravates the agency problems between management and 
debt holders and leads to greater costs of debt capital. In the context of agency conflicts and geography, 
we only know of two other studies by Landier, Nair and Wulf (2006) and Gao, Ng and Wang (2006) that 
motivate corporate decision making by governance related concerns, looking at geographic expansion of 
the firm’s subsidiaries. Our paper confirms the underlying intuition of the studies showing the ability to 
transmit “soft” versus “hard” information over distance, and in addition identifies the agency 
consequences of the fact that soft information is more prominently involved in the case of borrowing from 
proximate debt holders.    
Second, no paper explores the importance of geography in the context of debt holders. 
Bondholders are an important class of stakeholders, who account for a significant portion of many firms’ 
market capitalization and represent one of the world’s largest securities markets. Further, the bond market 
provides a natural setting to study how information structures affect asset prices given the institutional 
nature of the bond market investor base.
5 Given that the marginal bond investor is likely to be well 
diversified and informed, our setting is well tailored to examine the prediction in Hughes, Liu and Liu 
(2005) that as the economy becomes large with well-diversified investors, there should be no relation 
between information risk and the cost of debt capital. Extending on research that generally focuses on 
equity holders, we are able to show that geography affects not only shareholders but bondholders as well, 
and that its impact is aggravated by agency conflicts.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, variables and 
methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the relation between location and the firm’s cost 
of debt capital. Section 4 explores the information asymmetry and governance explanations to the 
differences found between rural and urban at-issue yield spreads, discusses their implications and 
                                                 
5 Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Flows and Outstandings, Fourth Quarter 2004, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Washington D.C. ,pp 89-90. 
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provides alternative specifications for robustness. Section 5 explores the role of external monitoring 
offered by private placement bond markets in alleviating agency problems between firm insiders and 
bondholders in rural firms. Section 6 examines the impact of SOX on the difference in the cost of debt 
capital between rural and urban companies. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data 
2.1. Sample and methodology 
To classify firms as urban or rural, we follow a number of authors, including Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999), Zhu (2002), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), Loughran and Schultz (2004, 2006) and others, and 
use a company’s headquarters as a proxy for its location. We obtain the headquarters locations for 
companies from Compustat, SDC and Hoover’s. We then find the latitude and longitude data for each 
firm’s headquarters using the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer city-state files 
(http://lii2.wested.org/pub/subtopic/51929). Following the definition in Loughran and Schultz (2006), a 
company is defined as an urban firm if its headquarters is in one of the ten largest metropolitan areas of 
the United States according to the 2000 census. These include New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, 
Washington- Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, and Houston. Companies 
located in a suburb of one of these cities are also included in the urban portfolio. A company is defined as 
rural if its headquarters is 100 miles or more from the center of any of the U.S. metropolitan areas of 1 
million or more people according to the 2000 census. Companies located in all other areas, that is, 
companies within 100 miles of any of the metropolitan areas of at least 1 million people but not one of the 
ten top largest cities, are then defined as small city firms. Using the latitude and longitude data, we 
compute the distance between each firm’s headquarters and the ten largest U.S. metropolitan areas 
including their suburbs, and between each firm and the U.S. metropolitan areas of at least 1 million 
people as defined by the 2000 census. We use the standard formula for computing the distance d(a,b) in 
statutory miles between two points, a and b as follows: 
1212 1 21 2 1 1 ( , ) arccos[cos( )cos( )cos( )cos( ) cos( )sin( )cos( )sin( ) sin( )sin( )] ...............(1) d a b aabb a ab b a b r =+ +  
Where  1 a  and  1 b  ( 2 a  and  2 b ) are the latitudes (longitudes) of the two points (expressed in radians), 
respectively, and r  denotes the radius of the earth (approximately 3,963 statutory miles). Based on the   8
above location definitions, we are then able to identify each firm in our sample as rural, urban or small-
city company. 
The main data source we use for extracting bond data is the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
New Issues database during the time period 1990-2004. For the purpose of calculating bond yield spreads, 
we use the risk-free term structure of interest rates taken from Bloomberg including the monthly treasury 
benchmark yields with 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 30 year coupon bonds. We also collect stock daily returns 
around the bond SEC filing date reported in SDC from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database for the purposes of examining shareholder wealth effects around bond issuances in rural and 
urban firms before and after the passage of the 2002 SOX Act. 
We also collect analyst data from the Institutional Broker Estimation System (I/B/E/S) annual 
consensus earning forecast. Specifically, we look at the number of analysts following the firm, as 
previous research shows that the level of analyst following is positively related to the information 
structure of the firm (Land and Lundholm, 1996). Firms without I/B/E/S coverage are assigned a value of 
zero analysts.  
For debt issues to be included in our analysis, data must be provided on the firm’s headquarters 
location, leverage, assets, amount, yield, duration, time to maturity, lead underwriter and underwriter 
syndicate, and credit rating of the firm’s fixed coupon rate, straight public debt securities. A total of 3,567 
debt issues on 951 firms during the period 1990-2004 meet these criteria. 
For debt issues to be included in our analysis of the impact of debt issuance on stock returns in 
rural and urban areas, data must include the announcement date of our public debt issues. For bond 
issuance announcement date we use the SEC registration filing date from SDC and Lexis/Nexis. If a firm 
registers two or more bond issues with the SEC on the same date, only the first bond issue is included in 
the final sample. An issuing firm’s stock must be traded on the New York Stock Exchange, American 
Stock Exchange or Nasdaq. To be in our sample, 310-day sample period around the bond issuance date 
stock returns was required. In addition, other sufficient data, such as bond rating and coupon rate, must be 
available. 683 bond issues were selected based on these criteria. Data availability and screening for 
confounding events reduced our sample to 579 bond issues that had sufficient estimation and event 
window data for the corresponding bond filing date.   9
Finally, we collected private placement bond data from SDC for the period 1990-2004.  All 
convertible bonds, variable rate bonds, and bonds with equity features such as warrants or rights were 
eliminated, leaving only fixed rate, straight bonds in our sample.  Because credit rating data do not appear 
on non-144A private placement bonds in SDC, we collected data on non-144A, as well as 144A private 
placement bonds. The final sample consists of 759 private placement bond issues for 469 firms, from 
which 467 issues are 144A rule bonds and 292 are non-144A ones.
6  A discussion of the variables we use 
in the study follows.  
 
2.2. Description of variables 
The dependent variable is the at-issue yield spread (Spread), defined as the difference between the yield 
to maturity on a coupon paying corporate bond and the yield to maturity on a coupon paying government 
bond with the same maturity date. We use bond-specific variables and also firm-specific control variables 
in our analysis. Bond related measures include: Credit rating (Rating), issuance proceeds (Proceeds), 
bond time to maturity in years (Time to maturity) and a dummy variable to denote high yield, non-
investment grade bonds with ratings below Baa3 (High yield issues).  A firm’s credit rating is measured 
by Moody’s bond ratings at the issue date.  Similar to Klockm Mansi and Maxwell (2005), we compute 
bond ratings using a linear conversion process in which Aaa ratings are assigned a value of 16 and B3 
ratings are assigned a value of 1. Corporate bonds that are rated below B3 are excluded from our sample 
because data on these bonds are not available for most of our sample.  All bond related data are obtained 
from SDC.  
Our firm-specific variables are obtained from Compustat and include headquarters location; issue 
size (Size), measured by the natural log of the firm’s issue size standardized by its total assets; firm 
leverage (Leverage), calculated as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; and firm profitability (ROA 
and market-to-book ratio). We calculate ROA as the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortization divided by total assets. For the market-to-book ratio we use the end of the previous 
year’s CRSP market value of equity   scaled by the prior fiscal year’s book value (defined as Compustat 
                                                 
6 Securities issued under Rule 144A do not have to file a public registration statement with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, but can be sold only to qualified financial institutions.   10
book value of equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes and investment credit minus the book value of 
preferred stock).  
To control for issuance frequency, we create a dummy variable to denote firms that have issued 
bonds more than once during the sample period (Multiple issuers). We also create a dummy variable to 
denote prestigious lead underwriters in our sample (Prestigious underwriters). We determine lead 
underwriters’ prestige based on the top-ten list in the Investment Dealer’s Digest’s annual league tables.  
Out of this list, we choose eight banks that appear almost every year in the recent ten years, namely: 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, CSFB, Lehman Brothers, JP Morgan 
and DLJ.
7 Although in the existing literature, a popular measure of underwriter reputation is the Carter-
Manaster ranking, we do not use this measure primarily because the bond underwriting market differs 
significantly from the equity underwriting market (Fang, 2005).   
We also control for firm visibility by taking into account the listing location of the issuing firms, 
and create a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is listed on Nasdaq, and 0 otherwise. To control 
for firm-specific governance and managerial entrenchment issues, we include the Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2005) entrenchment index (BCF index). In general, the BCF index consists of six variables 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) report as having the greatest explanatory power in affecting 
managerial entrenchment and vulnerability to takeovers, based on the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
governance index from IRRC. The index can take on a score of 0 to 6 and is the sum of six dummy 
variables equaling 1 if the sample firm has a poison pill, requires supermajority approval of mergers, has 
a golden parachute, has limits to amend its bylaws, has a staggered board, and has limits to amend its 
charter. 
Finally, we create dummy variables to track the headquarters location of each company, forming 
three groups: firms located in rural areas (Rural firms); firms located in urban areas (Urban firms) and 
firms that are not urban or rural (Small city firms), as a control group.  
 
2.3. Summary statistics 
                                                 
7 Similar to Fang (2005), instead of using a continuous measure of reputation, we convert the measure into a binary 
classification of the underwriters. Economically, the binary classification captures the empirically observed two 
tiered power structure in the investment banking industry, a bank either belongs to the “bulge bracket” club or it 
does not.       11
Table 1 provides summary descriptive statistics for rural, urban and small city firms. The data set is 
comprised of 951 firms and 3,567 bond issues, from which, the majority of issues was made by urban 
firms (1,773 issues), and the smallest proportion of issuance activity was made by to rural based 
companies (with 492 bond issues).   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel A presents the mean at-issue yield spreads across the three headquarters location groups. 
Rural firms have the highest at-issue spreads (165.43 basis points), in comparison to small city firms 
(155.94 basis points) and urban firms (141.02 basis points). All spread differentials are highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
A comparison of firm size across the three location groups indicates that rural firms are 
significantly smaller than urban and small city companies, with issue proceeds that are substantially lower 
as well. Consistently with findings in Loughran and Schultz (2006), who show that rural firms are less 
likely to issue seasoned equity offerings and thus hold a greater proportion of debt in their capital 
structure, rural firms in our sample are significantly more levered than other urban and small city 
companies (with 29.26%, 23.09%, and 25.37% leverage, respectively), issuing debt more frequently 
throughout the sample period (with 91% of rural firms issuing public debt more than once, in comparison 
to 88.09% of small city firms, and 84.63% of urban firms). Rural companies also hold longer maturity 
debt of 11.54 years to maturity on average, in comparison to 9.68 and 9.59 years to maturity for bonds 
issued by small city and urban firms, respectively. Like other studies (e.g., Malloy, 2005; Loughran and 
Schultz, 2006 and others), we find that rural companies are associated with Nasdaq listing, issuance 
activity that is accompanied by less prestigious underwriters, and less analysts coverage in comparison to 
firms located elsewhere.  
  Panel B of table 1 describes the industry distribution of the sample across location groups using 
the standard Security Industry Classification (SIC) codes. While about one third of rural and small city 
bond issuing firms are concentrated in the transportation industry, over 40% of urban firms are 
concentrated in manufacturing.  
Panel C of table 1 and figure 1 summarize both empirically and graphically the distribution of 
public bond issuance activity over time across the three location groups. Consistent with their smaller   12
size, rural firms exhibit the lowest issuance volume during each year of the sample period, whereas urban 
companies present the highest issuance activity over time. The similarity of issuance patterns across the 
three location groups in Figure 1 indicates that the bond issuance volume of firms in various areas was not 
driven by macroeconomic conditions that were specific to only a certain area. 
Panel A of table 2 reports the mean at-issue yield spreads across various rating categories for each 
of our three location groups: Rural, Small city, and Urban. The data are segmented into low risk, high to 
upper-medium quality debt (Aaa-A3), moderate risk, medium quality debt (Baa1-Baa3), and high-risk 
speculative debt (below Ba1).  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Interestingly, across all rating categories, rural firms have significantly higher at-issue yield 
spreads in comparison to all other firms, whereas urban companies have the lowest at-issue yield spreads, 
and the differences are highly significant for all rating groups.   
In panel B of table 2 we report mean at-issue yield spreads across various bond maturity 
categories and location groups. We segment our sample into short, medium and long term bonds, with 
under 3, 3-10 and over 10 years to maturity, respectively. We find that for all location groups, the mean 
at-issue yield spread is increasing for longer maturity periods, consistent with bonds with longer maturity 
being more risky. Importantly, our findings regarding the adverse impact of rural location on bondholders 
hold throughout all maturity groups, indicating that for every bond maturity horizon, rural based firms 
present the highest mean at-issue yield spreads, whereas urban firms report the lowest mean at-issue yield 
spreads. Differences in at-issue yield spreads between rural bonds and bonds issued by firms located 
elsewhere are statistically significant for all maturity horizons, at least at the 10% level.  
In general, the results in panels A and B of Table 2 indicate that location matters to bondholders, 
and that on average, at-issue bond yield spreads are higher for rural companies, regardless of their 
investment rating or maturity horizon.       13
 
3. The relation between corporate location and the cost of public debt capital  
3.1. Corporate location and the cost of public debt capital  
In this section, we test the cross sectional relation between corporate location and the cost of public debt 
financing, proxied by at-issue yield spreads, and controlling for firm and bond-specific measures, as 
defined above.
8 Time_dummies and Industry_dummis indicate time and industry dummies, respectively. 
The primary specification is:  
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We expect Size to be negatively related to the bond’s at-issue yield spread, as issue proceeds are 
associated with larger firms that are presumed to be more stable and less risky. Rating is expected to be to 
be negatively related the cost of debt capital as higher levels of rating indicate lower default risks. Time to 
maturity is expected to be positively related to at-issue yield spreads as bonds with higher maturity are 
considered to be more risky.  High yield, non-investment rated bonds should be associated with higher 
default risks and thus have higher costs of debt financing and at-issue yield spreads. Prestigious lead 
underwriters are expected to have a negative relationship to spreads as underwriting decisions reflect 
reputation concerns, and are thus informative of issue quality.  Multiple bond issuance by the same 
company is expected to be negatively related to at-issue yield spreads because a more frequent issuing 
and trading pattern conveys more information to investors about the firm’s performance and reduces 
adverse selection costs. We also expect the number of analysts covering the firm to be negatively 
associated with the at-issue spreads because greater disclosure of information is rewarded with lower 
costs of debt capital (Sengupta, 1998). 
Turning to the firm-specific variables, Leverage should have a positive relationship with at-issue 
yield spreads, as higher debt usage is associated with an increased probability of default and thus higher 
costs of debt financing.  We expect firm profitability (ROA) to be negatively related to the at-issue yield 
                                                 
8 The results are robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable, including the logarithm of at-issue 
yield spreads.     14
spread, as better performance indicates lower default risk and thus lower cost of debt financing. We 
expect a Nasdaq listing to be positively related with at-issue yield spreads, as Nasdaq firms tend to be 
smaller and thus perceived riskier by bondholders. Finally, we include year and industry dummy variables 
to control for possible time and industry effects.  The expected sign of Rural dummy and Small city 
dummy is positive because being located further away from investors and financial intermediaries is 
expected to be associated with greater difficulties in obtaining information and monitoring firm insiders.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Column (1) of Table 3 provides the primary regression specification. The rural dummy variable is 
equal to 1 if the firm’s headquarters is located at least 100 miles away from metropolitan areas of at least 
1 million people, as defined by the 2000 census, and 0 otherwise. The small city dummy variable is equal 
to 1 if the firm’s headquarters is not located in a rural area or in one of the ten largest metropolitan areas 
in the U.S., and 0 otherwise. The results show strong evidence that corporate geographic location 
significantly affects the at-issue spreads of public bonds, even after controlling for bond and company 
specific characteristics. The evidence suggests that the cost of debt issued by firms located in rural areas 
is about 19 basis points higher than that of firms located in urban areas. This difference is significant at 
the 1% level with a t-statistic of 2.364. Bonds issued by firms located in small cities exhibit at-issue yield 
spreads that are 8 basis points higher than those of urban companies (t-statistic=1.995). The coefficient 
estimates of the other control variables all bear their expected signs with conventional significance levels. 
The explanatory power of the model is above 59% suggesting that the data explain a substantial portion of 
the spread variation.     
Columns (2) and (3) present our primary specification looking at large and small firms, 
respectively, based on the median asset size of the firms in our sample (15 billion dollars). We find both 
the rural and small city dummies to be positive and highly significant in both sub samples, with lower 
coefficient sizes in the large firms sub sample. This is consistent with larger firms being associated with a 
lower risk of default. 
Finally, in columns (4) and (5), we segment the data into investment rated and speculative bonds, 
respectively. Non-rated bonds are high risk, speculative bonds, with a Moody’s bond rating below Baa3. 
The findings in columns (4) and (5) support our earlier findings that a rural or a small city location of the   15
firm’s headquarters, significantly increases its cost of publicly issued debt capital in comparison to similar 
urban firms. The cost of issued debt capital is especially high when looking at rural firms. These are 
presumably the type of firms that are more difficult to observe and monitor, located further away from 
market makers and financial intermediaries.  
 
3.2. Robustness tests 
In this section we conduct a battery of robustness checks, including alternative sample selection criteria, 
alternative measures of geographic location, and tests to rule out the presence of endogeneity in our 
models. These various tests generate qualitatively similar results to the ones reported above. In Table 4 
we provide robustness checks on the relation between corporate location and the cost of debt capital. 
[Inset Table 4 about here] 
Columns (1) and (2) segment the data into Nasdaq and non-Nasdaq listed firms. If firms listed on 
Nasdaq are perceived to be riskier than firms listed elsewhere, then all else equal, we should see a larger 
impact of rural location for bonds issued by Nasdaq listed firms. Consistent with this notion, we find that 
the rural dummy is positive and statistically significant for both Nasdaq and non-Nasdaq listed firms, with 
a higher coefficient for Nasdaq companies. Specifically, the spread differential between Nasdaq rural and 
urban companies is about 35 basis points, whereas the differential for non-Nasdaq firms is only about 14 
basis points.  
In columns (3) and (4) we segment the data into firms that issued bonds only once throughout the 
sample period (one-time-issuers) versus firms that issued bonds more than once during the sample years 
(multiple issuers), respectively. If bond spreads in urban firms are lower simply due to greater issuance 
activity, resulting in higher liquidity and visibility, we should not expect to find a significant relationship 
between at-issue yield spreads and our location dummies for one-time-issuers. The results indicate, 
however, that even for one-time-issuers there is a significant location effect.  
In column (5), we follow Loughran and Schultz (2006) and look at a sub sample of utility 
companies (SIC 4900-4999, according to the Fama and French (1997) industry classification codes). In 
general, there are several methodological advantages of testing our model on a sample of utility 
companies. First, looking at a single industry segment controls for cross sectional variation in spreads that   16
is driven by industry effects. Second, as argued by Loughran and Schultz (2006), looking at utility firms 
can help us alleviate endogeneity concerns. Throughout our model, we make the assumption that 
corporate location decisions are exogenous. That is, location is not a choice variable that is affected by the 
company’s perceived cost of debt capital in the area. Examining utilities gives the economic rationale for 
companies choosing their location based on local resources, skilled employees, customers, market 
competition, etc., rather than costs of debt capital. Since a utility serves a particular geographic area, it 
cannot economically locate its headquarters away from its customer base and power generation. Hence, it 
is implausible that results for utilities are biased by endogeneity. Indeed, as with our results above, we 
find a positive and significant association between a rural (and small city) location and the cost of debt 
financing for utility firms. 
To correct for potential endogeneity problems, we follow the methodology in Loughran and 
Schultz (2006), and estimate the impact of location on the cost of debt capital using a two stage least 
square approach. For the first stage, we choose an instrument for rural location that is highly correlated 
with rural location, but uncorrelated with the error term from regressing bond at-issue yield spreads on 
location. Using data from the 2000 census on demographic profiles in the counties utilized in our sample, 
we employ the proportion of females that are 65 years and over, as an instrument for rural location.
9 
While it is plausible that a firm may locate its headquarters in a certain area due to costs of debt 
considerations, it is implausible that a company will choose a certain location based on the proportion of 
elderly women in the area. Hence, while our instrument is positively and highly correlated with a rural 
location, it is uncorrelated with corporate location decisions. In the first stage regression, we run a logit 
model in which the dependent variable receives a value of 1 if the firm is located in a rural area, and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables include our instrumental variable and the control variables 
employed in our original specification. The coefficient of the instrumental variable is positive and 
significant (t-statistic=7.475), indicating that in comparison to other areas, a larger proportion of the 
population of rural areas is comprised of females who are 65 years or older. In the second stage 
regression, we regress at-issue yield spreads on the instrumental variable and the other original control 
variables. The coefficient on the instrumental variable for a rural location is positive and highly 
                                                 
9 Demographic data can be found at: http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/dp_comptables.html   17
significant (t-statistic=4.330), indicating that after adjusting for endogeneity, rural location remains a 
significant factor in determining the cost of debt capital.
10  
As final robustness tests, we use different specifications for urban location. In column (6) we 
define urban firms as those located in New York City, and in Column (7), urban firms are those located in 
one of the five largest U.S. metropolitan areas, namely, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington-
Baltimore, and San Francisco. Rural and small city locations are defined as before. Results hold for each 
specification, indicating that being located in a remote area adversely affects the firm’s bondholders.  
 
4. Causes for the cost of debt differential between rural and urban firms 
So far, we have presented robust evidence that rural location is associated with higher costs of 
debt capital. In this section, we explore the possible sources of these higher costs. Specifically, we 
examine whether the information environment of the firm or the quality of its corporate governance can 
explain our finding of higher at-issue yield spreads for rural companies.  
 
4.1. Information asymmetry 
As we discussed in the introduction, a potential cost that comes with geographic remoteness is 
related to information asymmetry due to the distance barrier between corporate insiders and investors. 
Loughran and Schultz (2006) point out that “greater distance implies a meaningful disadvantage in 
obtaining information”. In this subsection, we examine whether a firm’s information environment affects 
the cost of debt capital associated with corporate location.  
We characterize the information environment of firms based on the level of analyst following a 
firm receives. Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2004) find that higher analyst coverage is associated with 
lower costs of debt capital, and that the economic impact of analyst activity is largest for firms with 
relatively larger amounts of private information, proxied by the level of intangible assets. Barth, Kasznik, 
and McNichols (2001) show that analysts expend significantly more effort in firms with greater amounts 
of private information, and Easley and O’Hara (2004) also argue that the flow of information has a greater 
impact on the cost of capital of firms with relatively less public information available.  Finally, Malloy 
                                                 
10 Results are available upon request.    18
(2005) finds that geographically proximate analysts are more accurate than remote ones, and that this 
effect is strongest for firms located in small cities and remote areas, and for small firms.  
Companies in distant rural areas are presumably able to retain private information more 
successfully than proximate urban firms, due to the greater difficulty of direct observations of these 
companies and their employees, direct face-to-face constant interaction with their management, etc. 
(Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). However, if local analysts extend more effort in revealing private 
information, especially for firms in remote areas, then controlling for analyst coverage in our model 
should take away the significant relation between at-issue yield spreads and location dummies.  
[Inset Table 5 about here] 
In Table 5 we present regression results of the impact of the information environment on firms’ 
cost of debt financing. Columns (1) and (2) segment the data into firms that have received analyst 
coverage and firms without analyst following, respectively. We note that although the impact of rural 
location on the cost of debt is weaker in firms receiving analyst coverage, it is still significant at the 5% 
level. Specifically, rural firms that receive analyst coverage have at-issue yield spreads that are 18 basis 
points higher than those of similar urban firms, and rural firms that did not receive analyst coverage 
exhibit at-issue yield spreads that are 24 basis points higher than those of comparable urban companies.  
Since analyst coverage has been shown to increase in firm size (Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols, 
2001), in columns (3)-(6) we control for firm size along with whether or not the firm received analyst 
coverage. Small firms are defined as those with asset size equal to or below the full sample median, and 
large firms are those with asset size above the median size of the full sample. In columns (3) and (4) we 
look at small firms with and without analyst coverage, respectively, and in columns (5) and (6) we look at 
large firms with and without analyst coverage, respectively. The results in columns (3)-(6) are consistent 
with those reported above, indicating that geographic remoteness is significantly and positively related to 
the firm’s cost of debt capital, regardless of firm size and whether or not the company received analyst 
coverage.  
Overall, the results in this section suggest that while the information environment of the firm 
affects its bondholders, the significant impact of geographic location on the firm’s cost of debt capital 
cannot be fully explained by information asymmetry considerations. We next explore the role of   19
corporate governance and monitoring in explaining the significantly higher costs of debt capital in rural 
firms.  
 
4.2. Corporate governance 
Corporate governance can adversely affect bondholders in rural companies in two main ways. 
First, management of poorly governed firms could pursue corporate strategies that increase their own 
benefits to the detriment of bondholders. For example, locating the corporate headquarters further away 
from investors and analysts for the purpose of living a quiet life, instead of focusing on location choices 
based on economic considerations, such as easy access to local resources etc., can consequently provide 
both monetary and non-monetary gains to corporate executives at the expense of the firm’s capital 
providers. Second, geographic remoteness increases the difficulty of external monitoring by shareholders, 
analysts, institutional investors and banks, who rely on a flow of hard, as well as soft information from 
corporate insiders. If the physical access to rural firms by their financial intermediaries is more difficult, 
then closely monitoring their management can potentially become increasingly costly, and might then 
result in greater agency problems between managers and bondholders. We consider both possibilities in 
our analysis. 
We employ corporate governance information from Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2005), who 
create an entrenchment index based on six provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) data. The BCF index for each firm varies between 0 and 6, which is constructed by adding one 
point for every specific provision in place and zero otherwise. As a result, a higher value of the BCF 
index signifies higher levels of managerial entrenchment and agency costs.  
We first investigate whether a firm’s governance affects its location decisions. To investigate how 
a location choice relates to its governance quality, we run a logit regression (unreported) in which the 
dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm is located in a rural area, and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables include the BCF index along with our original control variables. The coefficient on the BCF 
index in the logit regression is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the firm’s governance quality is 
not likely to affect its location decisions.    20
To examine the role of corporate governance in the relation between rural location and the cost of 
debt capital, we classify firms based on both corporate governance ranking and geographic location. First, 
we divide the whole sample into two sub samples: firms with good governance quality and firms with bad 
governance quality. The construction of the sub samples is as follows. We rank firms’ BCF index and 
find its median within each year. All the firm-year observations for which the BCF index is lower or 
equal to the median are assigned to the good governance sub sample, while the other firm-year 
observations are assigned to the bad governance sub sample. Second, we further divide the two sub 
samples into three groups according to a firm’s geographic location status (rural, small city or urban). As 
a result, we have six groups of sample firms. We then calculate the average at-issue yield spread for each 
group of firm-year observations. Table 6 shows the results. 
[Inset Table 6 about here] 
The results indicate that on average, the impact of geographic location on spreads varies with 
firms’ governance quality. Particularly, being located in a rural area (urban area) is associated with the 
highest (lowest) costs of debt capital in comparison to being located in other areas, especially for firms 
with bad governance quality. The mean and median spread differential between rural firms and firms 
located elsewhere in both well and badly governed firms is statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
Examined differently, corporate governance quality affects the spread associated with location. For 
example, for rural firms, those with bad governance have yield spreads that are about 20 basis points 
significantly higher than those with good governance. However, for urban (small city) companies, those 
with bad governance have yield spreads that are only about 10 (16) basis points significantly higher than 
their counterparts with good governance. Hence, on average, the adverse impact of bad governance on 
bondholders is magnified in geographic remoteness, which is consistent with the interoperation that 
geographic distance reduces the effectiveness of external monitoring.  
We next conduct a multivariate analysis of the relationship between governance quality and the 
impact of geographic location on at-issue yield spreads. The results are reported in Table 7. 
[Inset Table 7 about here] 
  The sample firms we employ in the regressions are those whose BCF index is available. The 
dependent variable is the firm’s at-issue yield spreads. Independent variables include the control variables   21
used in the above regressions, and the BCF index. The results in Column (1) Table 7 indicate that the cost 
of debt capital is increasing with the entrenchment of the firm’s management. One point increase in the 
BCF index would lead to a 8 basis points increase in firm at-issue yield spreads, implying that the better 
the corporate governance, the lower is the cost of debt financing. Column (2) expands Column (1) by 
including the rural and small city dummies in the regression. Being located in a rural or small city 
location is positively and significantly related to bond at-issue spreads, and the BCF index remains 
positive and statistically significant. It is evident that the impact of geographic location and corporate 
governance do not subsume each other’s role in determining a firm’s cost of debt capital. Column (3) 
allows for differential impacts of geographic location (rural or small city) with respect to firms’ 
governance quality in a multivariate setting. The model therefore introduces two interaction terms, which 
are constructed by interacting governance quality with the two location dummies. The primary 
specification of the model in Column (3) is the following: 
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Consistent with the sample classifications in Table 6, the Good governance dummy is 1 if a 
firm’s BCF index is below the median BCF index of all sample firms for each year, and 0 if otherwise. 
Similarly, the Bad governance dummy is 1 if a firm’s BCF index is above or equal to the median BCF 
index of all sample firms for each year, and 0 if otherwise. The coefficients on the interaction terms show 
that the impact of being located in a rural or small city area on the firm’s cost of debt capital is 
statistically significant for firms with both good and bad governance quality, but it is more pronounced in 
badly governed firms. More specifically, the coefficient of the interaction between bad governance and 
the rural (small city) dummy is about 26 (10) basis points and statistically significant. In comparison, the 
coefficient on the interaction between good governance and the rural (small city) dummy reduces to 10 
(3) basis points and is statistically significant as well. 
Overall, the evidence from the multivariate analysis confirms the conclusion from the univariate 
analysis of Table 6. Geographic remoteness is associated with a statistically significant increase in the   22
cost of debt capital for both well and badly governed firms, but the adverse impact of remoteness on 
bondholders is magnified in badly governed firms. Hence, it seems apparent that corporate governance 
contributes to the adverse effect of geographic remoteness on the firm’s debt holders because of changes 
in the monitoring mechanism. Within urban and small city firms, the at-issue spread difference between 
good and bad governance firms is much smaller than the difference in the sample of rural firms. Such 
results are consistent with the interpretation that the adverse impact of bad corporate governance is 
magnified in geographically remote firms, because geographic distance reduces the effectiveness of 
external monitoring. 
 
5. Exploring the role of external monitoring in rural firms 
In the previous section we found that high quality corporate governance can alleviate some of the agency 
problems between management and bondholders in remote rural firms. In this section we aim to 
investigate the role of external monitoring in aligning the interests of firm insiders and debt holders. We 
begin by exploring the impact of corporate location on the cost of private debt. We then examine the 
impact of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the debt agency problems in rural companies.  
 
5.1. Private placement bond issues 
In general, private placement bonds are non-underwritten, unregistered corporate bonds that are sold 
directly to a single investor or a single group of investors. Most lenders in the private placement market 
are institutions such as commercial banks and life insurance companies that specialize in performing 
comprehensive credit evaluations before the debt issue and in monitoring firm performance after the debt 
issue.   
Myers (1977) argues that short-term debt that comes up for renegotiation before completion of 
the project along with monitoring of the firm’s operating and investment decisions can mitigate the moral 
hazard problem between bondholders and shareholders, caused by asset substitution and underinvestment. 
Such monitoring is typically achieved in privately placed debt by incorporating restrictive covenants that 
are not standard in public issues (Smith and Warner, 1979). Fama (1985) also argues that private debt 
investors have better access to private information, and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), and Gertner   23
and Scharfstein (1991), contend that private debt financing has an advantage in terms of efficiency of 
liquidation and renegotiation in financial distress.  These features make private placements particularly 
effective in controlling agency conflicts between borrowers and lenders.     
 
5.1.1. Descriptive statistics of private debt issues 
Table 8 reports the characteristics of the private debt sample, which contains a total of 759 issues 
during 1990-2004. The characteristics of the public debt issuances are also provided for comparison 
purposes.  The total average amount of private and public debt raised by the sample firms is $375.0 
million.  Public debt accounts for $237.7 million and private debt $137.3 million. 292 firms issued Non-
144A private debt that accounts for an average amount of $38.7 million and 467 firms issued 144A 
private debt that accounts for an average of $199 million.  It appears that although, on average, private 
debt issues are smaller than public debt issues, they are economically important financing events for 
borrowing firms.  
  [Inset Table 8 about here] 
We also note that the average proceeds for rule 144A issues and publicly traded debt are close in 
size, consistent with findings in other papers (see, e.g., Fenn, 2000). The average at-issue yield spread in 
basis points for public issues is 149.8 (median 100.5), and the median Moody’s credit rating is 10.2, 
which is equivalent to a rating value A2.  Average at-issue yield spreads are higher for private issuers 
(255.3 basis points), and are the highest for 144A private placements (315.9 basis points).  The average 
Moody’s rating for private debt issues (only for 144A) is significantly lower than for public debt issues 
(12.1, equivalent to Ba3) at the 1% level.  
Firms making public debt issues are significantly larger than those making private debt issues.  
On average, firms issuing publicly traded debt have an asset size that is about twice as large as that of 
firms issuing private debt.  Public bonds are also issued significantly more often than private bonds, with 
about 87% multiple issues in comparison to 53% multiple issues of private bonds. These differences in 
size and issuance frequency are consistent with firms issuing greater amounts to take advantage of the 
economies of scale in public debt issues (Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988; Carey et al.,1993).    24
About 80% of the private placements in our sample are high yield issues, in comparison to only 
14% in the public bonds sample.  Interestingly, Fenn (2000) reports that virtually all high-yield 144A 
private placements are registered for public sale within four to seven months after issuance.  Once 
registered, these securities are essentially identical to the privately placed securities in terms of priority, 
maturity, and covenants. This suggests that at the time of issuance, there is something particularly 
advantageous about private placements.  Fenn argues that the speed of issuance is the determining factor. 
This is consistent with our finding that firms issuing 144A private debt are characterized by low credit 
quality.  Presumably, these are firms with the greatest need for speed of issuance to avoid costly default. 
Consistent with this notion, private placements are also on average significantly more leveraged than 
publicly traded bonds, with 34.3% versus 24.8%, respectively.  The differences in leverage are driven by 
144A issues, with a mean of 46.2%.   
Up to this point, consistent with Denis and Mihov (2003), we find that public borrowers are larger 
and have higher credit ratings than firms borrowing from private lenders. Conversely, firms that borrow 
from private lenders tend to have the lowest credit rating and the highest ex-ante probability of default. 
In Table 9 we control for the firm’s credit rating and compare between at-issue yield spreads, for 
144A private placements and publicly issued bonds in our three location groups.11 We find that the at-
issue yield spread differences between rule 144A bonds and publicly traded bonds are mainly driven by 
the lowest speculative rating group, Ba1-B3.  For all other rating categories, at-issue yield spreads are 
lower for private placements in comparison to public debt.  Most important and consistent with our results 
for public debt issues, we find that across all rating categories, rural firms have the highest at-issue yield 
spreads, whereas urban firms have the lowest.  We also find that in comparison to public debt at-issue 
yield spreads, investment grade private at-issue yield spreads are significantly lower, a finding which is 
consistent with the notion that private placement debt markets are an effective mechanism, which better 
aligns the interests of managers and bondholders.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
                                                 
11 Because SDC does not provide rating data for non-144A private placement bonds, we were not able to control for 
credit rating for this sample as well.    25
5.1.2. Regression analysis of private debt issues 
In Table 10 we regress the at-issue yield spreads of 144A private bond placements on the rural and small 
city location dummies and the set of control variables as described above. However, since private bonds 
are mainly issued by small companies that analysts do not typically follow, we do not include a variable 
to indicate the level of analyst coverage as before.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
  In column (1) we run our primary regression, using the 144A private bond sample of 467 issues. 
The results show that for private placements, the geographic location dummies insignificantly affect the 
at-issue yield spreads, both statistically and economically. We then run the regression on a sub sample of 
small firms (based on median asset size) and present our findings in Column (2). Firm size is often used 
as a proxy for the amount of public information available about a company, where small firms are 
typically associated with higher levels of information asymmetry (Harris, 1994). However, the results in 
column (2) reveal that location plays no significant role in explaining the variation in the cost of private 
debt for small firms. These results are consistent with the strong monitoring environment offered in 
private placement markets.  
  In column (3) we run the regression on a sub sample of badly governed firms, as defined above. 
These are the firms that suffer from the highest levels of agency problems. Results, however, indicate that 
private debt markets do a good job of monitoring managers, even when they are relatively entrenched.  
  Columns (4), (5), and (6) segment the data into highly levered firms (based on sample median), 
speculative issues, and one-time issuers, respectively. These are all bond issues/firms that that are 
perceived to be risky by bondholders. If geographic remoteness aggravates agency problems between firm 
insiders and bondholders, then these are exactly the type of bond issues that bondholders in rural 
companies should ask a higher risk premium for. Nevertheless, we find that location no longer plays a 
significant role in explaining at-issue bond spreads when looking at private placements. These findings 
support our previous ones that information asymmetry alone cannot explain the cross sectional 
differences in the cost of debt financing across firms in various locations, and that the external monitoring 
difficulty of remote firms aggravate the agency problems between bondholders and managers in public 
debt markets.      26
 
6. Exploring the role of regulation in rural firms 
In this section we estimate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act on the variation in the cost of 
debt capital across firms located in various areas. In general, the SOX Act was signed into law on July 
30th 2002, and introduced highly significant legislative changes to financial practice and corporate 
governance regulation. It introduced stringent new rules with the stated objective: "to protect investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws".
12 
The legislation is wide ranging and establishes new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company 
boards, management, and public accounting firms. The Act contains 11 titles, or sections, ranging from 
additional corporate board responsibilities to criminal penalties, and requires the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to implement rulings on requirements to comply with the new law.  
 
6.1. Regression analysis of the impact of SOX on agency problems in rural firms   
We compare between the at-issue yield spreads of public bonds across companies in rural, small city and 
urban firms, before and after SOX enactment. Looking at the time period before and after legislation of 
these laws offers important insights on the relation between location and the cost of debt capital, because 
it allows us to examine how location affects bondholders given exogenous changes in the firm’s 
monitoring and corporate governance environment. 
Table 11 estimates coefficients from regressing public bonds at-issue yield spreads on the 
location dummies (Rural dummy and Small city dummy) and firm and bond specific control variables as 
before.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 segment the data into bonds issued before the SOX Act was 
signed into law (July 30, 2002) and bond issues after the SOX Act passage, respectively. The results 
indicate that location plays a significant role in explaining bond spreads before SOX, but an insignificant 
role thereafter. These results are consistent with the notion that improvements in corporate governance 
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and disclosure quality can mitigate agency problems between managers and debt holders caused by a 
difficulty of monitoring insiders’ activities.  
In columns (3) and (4) we look at a sub sample of small firms (based on the full sample’s asset 
size median) before and after SOX, respectively. We find that rural firms issuing public debt before SOX 
passage were experiencing significantly higher costs of debt than their urban counterparts of about 65 
basis points. Following SOX, however, these firms were no longer different than urban companies, with 
respect to the cost of issuing public debt.  
Finally, columns (5) and (6) segment the data into poorly governed firms before and after SOX, 
respectively. Badly governed firms were identified as before, with a BCF index equal to or greater than 
the median BCF index of all the sample firms within each year. The results in columns (5) and (6) are 
consistent with the previous ones, indicating that before SOX, rural firms suffered from higher costs of 
debt financing in comparison to their urban counterparts, but following SOX, these differences had 
become both economically and statistically insignificant.  
 
6.2. Shareholder reaction to bond issuance before and after SOX 
Finally, we explore the shareholder reaction to bond issuance before and after SOX, across our three 
location groups. So far, our results indicate that corporate location has a statistically and economically 
significant impact on at-issue bond spreads and therefore on the firm’s cost of capital.  We show that 
firms located in rural areas have significantly higher costs of debt financing than firms located elsewhere, 
while the opposite is true for firms located in urban areas.  We attribute our findings to the notion that 
bondholders in firms located in remote rural areas face a higher cost of debt financing due to the greater 
difficulty of monitoring these distant companies, which results in a greater likelihood of insiders 
withholding value relevant information from bondholders in such firms. In this section we test whether 
shareholders perceive bond issuance as a monitoring device in rural, less visible companies, and whether 
there is a difference between shareholder reaction to bond issuance before and after SOX.  
To investigate shareholders’ reaction to public bond issuance we estimate abnormal returns 
associated with the bond issue.  To compute the abnormal returns we use standard event study 
methodology (see, e.g., Brown and Warner, 1985). The market model abnormal returns are computed   28
using the CRSP equally weighted index returns.  The parameters for the market model are estimated over 
the (-250, - 20) day interval.  Using these parameters, we estimate the abnormal returns over a three-day 
announcement period (-1, +1).  
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
An overview of the CARs for the three location groups of firms appears in Table 12.  This table 
shows the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs-1, +1) for the event period. The full 
sample includes 579 bond issues, from which 69 belong to rural based firms, 190 to small city firms and 
320 to urban companies.  The results in Panel A show that CARs for all three location groups are 
insignificantly different from zero before and after SOX. However, when we look at a sub sample of 
small firms (Panel B), the results indicate that while after SOX passage, shareholders’ reaction to bond 
issuance is insignificant across all location groups, before SOX, shareholders in small rural companies 
exhibit a positive and significant reaction of 0.841% (t=2.093). Taken together, these findings indicate 
that before SOX was passed, shareholders in small, less visible rural companies viewed debt issuance as a 
monitoring mechanism, however, after the SOX enactment, with improved monitoring and governance in 
place, bond issuance was no longer viewed as a news event by shareholders.  
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
We explore the impact of headquarters location on the firm’s cost of debt capital. Looking at private and 
public debt issues from SDC, over the period 1990-2004 we find that being located in a rural area is 
associated with higher costs of debt financing, and the further the firm is from its investors and financial 
intermediaries, the greater are the costs of debt capital. Our study explores two potential causes for the 
higher cost of debt financing found for rural firms in comparison to their urban counterparts. We find 
evidence consistent with the agency cost based explanations. Firms located in rural areas experience 
higher costs of debt because it is more difficult to monitor insider activities in such firms. We find that 
agency problems that are caused by a greater difficulty to monitor remote firms are significantly mitigated 
in private debt issues and following the passage of the 2002 SOX Act. Taken together, these findings 
indicate that enhanced external monitoring and regulatory improvements in firm governance can   29
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Table 1: Sample description of variable measures, industry data, and issuance volume 
 
Panel A provides mean summary statistics of the bond data employed in the analysis. The dataset is 
comprised of 951 firms and 3,567 public debt issues covering the period 1990-2004. Following Loughran 
and Schultz (2006), a company is located in an urban area if its headquarters is in the metropolitan area of 
New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, 
or Houston. Rural companies are those located at least 100 miles away from the center of a metropolitan 
area of at least 1 million people, as defined by the 2000 census. Small city firms are defined as those that 
are not urban or rural. The variables include: At issue bond yield spreads (Spread) in basis points, issue 
proceeds (Proceeds) in $mil, Moody’s rating, market-to-book ratio, bond time to maturity in years, asset 
size (Assets), return on assets (ROA), leverage in %, a dummy variable to denote non-investment rated 
bonds (High yield issues), a dummy variable to denote whether the issue was accompanied by a 
prestigious underwriters (Prestigious underwriters), a dummy variable to denote Nasdaq listed firms, and 
the number of analysts covering the company. Panel B includes the percentage of issues in each industry 
by headquarters’ location. Panel C provides information regarding the volume of bond issues over time, 
by the location of the issuing firm. The labels ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively.     
 















Spread (in basis points)  165.43  155.94 141.02 2.71***  3.45***  2.07*** 
Proceeds (in $mil)  209.93  235.96 246.74 -3.22** -4.52***  -1.61 
Moody’s Rating 
a 10.86  9.99 10.13 3.48***  3.15***  -1.55 
Market-to-book ratio  2.03  2.48 2.76 0.62  1.18  -0.46 
Time to maturity (in 
years) 
11.65 9.68 9.59 4.74***  4.99***  -0.14 
Assets (in $bil)  11.54  18.98 22.65 -4.85***  -7.70***  -2.81*** 
ROA (in %)  5.20  6.03 8.46 -3.71***  -4.40***  -2.74*** 
Leverage (in %)  29.26  25.37 23.09 2.82***  3.45***  2.66*** 




78.00 80.77 82.62 -1.54  -1.79*  -1.36 
% on Nasdaq  50.71  46.90 31.58 1.27  2.72***  2.26*** 
Multiple issues (in %)  91.00  88.09 84.63 3.44***  2.75***  3.17*** 
Number of analysts  4.62  5.33 7.24 1.73*  3.96***  2.62*** 
Number of bond issues  493  1,301 1,773      
Number of firms  142  352 457  
 
                                                 
a Moody ratings were converted to discrete numerical values ranging from 1 for B3 ratings to 16 for Aaa ratings.  
b Prestigious lead bond underwriters were denoted as JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch &Co., Credit 
Suisse First Boston, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs & Co., Salomon Brothers and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 
Inc.       34
 
Panel B: Industry data by location 
SIC code  Title of industries  % Rural Firms  % Small city 
Firms 
% Urban Firms 
1  Mining and Construction  4.46  5.46  10.10 
2 Manufacturing  (Food-
Petroleum) 
16.63 24.90 23.07 
3 Manufacturing  (Plastics-
Electronics) 
17.44 12.45 20.02 
4 Transportation  33.39  31.46  13.80 
5  Wholesale Trade and Retail 
Trade 
15.42 10.99  8.91 
6  Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate 
9.21 4.36 3.41 
7 Services  (Hotels-Recreation)  1.83  7.15  15.62 
8 Services  (Health-Private 
Household) 
1.01 3.00 3.38 
9  Public Administration   0.61 0.23 1.68 
Total    100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Panel C: Issuance volume over time by location 
Year  No. of issues by 
rural firms 
No. of issues by 
small city firms 
No. of issues 
by urban 
firms 
1990 3  8  7 
1991 1  1  5 
1992 13  29  35 
1993 9  35  54 
1994 20  46  88 
1995 29  53  95 
1996 37  98  137 
1997 32  97  272 
1998 26  81  96 
1999 27  89  138 
2000 35  94  139 
2001 101  231  223 
2002 77  233  231 
2003 57  136  160 
2004 26 70 93 
Total 493  1,301  1,773 
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Table 2: Spread means by location across various rating and maturity categories 
 
This table shows the mean at-issue yield spreads for each of the three location samples (rural, small city, 
and urban) across various Moody’s rating categories and maturity horizons. Moody’s rating categories 
segment the data into low risk, high to upper-medium quality bonds (Aaa-A3), moderate risk, medium 
quality bonds (Baa1-Baa3), and high-risk speculative bonds (Ba1-B3). Maturity categories include short 
(under 3 years to maturity), medium (3-10 years to maturity), and long-term bonds (over 10 years to 
maturity).   
 
















   N=18 N=48 N=344     
Investment    Aaa-A3  95.22  76.44  71.43  2.81*** 3.14*** 2.02*** 
Grade          
   N=436 N=1,084 N=1,148     
  Baa1-Baa3  163.14 152.38  147.59 2.61*** 3.38*** 2.14*** 
           
           
Speculative   N=39 N=169 N=281     
Grade  Ba1-B3  223.58 201.37  199.25 3.84*** 4.02*** 1.82*** 
 















 N=25 N=114 N=186    
<3 84.67  81.27  76.36  1.71*  2.45***  1.94*** 
          
 N=172 N=604 N=805    
3-10  136.36 130.28 123.99  1.98*** 3.32*** 2.54*** 
          
 N=296 N=583 N=782    
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Table 3: Bond at-issue yield spreads and location 
 
This table estimates coefficients from regressing corporate yield spreads on the location dummies (A 
Rural dummy, for firms located at least 100 miles away from metropolitan areas of at least 1 million 
people; and a Small city dummy, for firms that are not rural or urban), and various control variables. 
Urban firms are defined as those a company is located in the metropolitan area of New York City, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, or Houston. Control 
variables include Moody’s rating (Rating), bond time to maturity in years (Time to maturity), issue size 
estimated by the issue proceeds standardized by firm asset size (Size), return on assets in % (ROA), 
leverage in % (Leverage), a high-yield dummy (High Yield) to denote firms with non-investment grade 
debt (below Baa3), a bond underwriter dummy to denote bonds underwritten prestigious underwriters 
(Prestigious underwriter dummy), a Nasdaq dummy (Nasdaq dummy) to denote firms listed on Nasdaq, 
the logarithm of the number of analysts covering the issuing firm (Log(1+Analysts)), a multiple issuer 
dummy (Multiple issuer) to denote bonds issued more than once over the sample period, and year and 
industry dummies (not reported). The data covers the period 1990-2004, with 3,567 bond issues, from 
which 493 belong to rural firms, 1,301 to small city firms, and 1,773 to urban companies. Column (1) 
provides the primary OLS regression. Columns (2) and (3) divide the sample into large and small firms, 
respectively, according to the asset size median. Columns (4) and (5) segment the data into investment 


















Intercept  239.534 331.249 235.770  233.819  343.485 
  (12.475) (14.178) (11.914)  (16.612)  (12.441) 
Rural  dummy  19.282 9.508 36.361  15.156  30.957 
 (2.364)  (4.699)  (2.784)  (2.281)  (5.475) 
Small city dummy  8.222  6.475  11.694  -1.662  10.263 
 (1.995)  (1.786)  (2.101)  (-1.165)  (3.283) 
Size  -2.717 -1.788 -2.521  -1.565  -2.875 
  (-1.926) (-2.025) (-1.922)  (-2.131)  (-3.120) 
ROA  -1.446 -1.536 -5.257  -1.221  -4.010 
  (-2.019) (-2.647) (-1.725)  (-2.181)  (-1.936) 
Leverage  27.139 20.781 33.355  21.067  34.846 
 (3.687)  (2.332)  (1.179)  (3.151)  (3.465) 
Rating -12.613  -11.368  -17.217  -12.475  -15.471 
  (-5.539) (-9.388) (-4.230)  (-11.950)  (-14.980) 
Time  to  maturity  5.442 5.105 5.415  5.162  6.942 
 (3.101)  (3.412)  (2.476)  (1.969)  (1.931) 
High yield dummy  69.940  50.716  127.173     
 (3.395)  (3.402)  (9.829)     
Prestigious underwriter 
dummy 
-16.906 -4.730 -30.338  -17.410  -4.351 
  (-1.962) (-2.520) (-4.847)  (-2.136)  (1.977) 
Nasdaq  dummy  14.384 8.075 20.071  4.827  6.830 
 (1.836)  (1.474)  (1.937)  (2.470)  (3.264) 
Log(1+Analysts) -22.846  -12.374 -32.464  -24.363  -14.364 
  (-2.037) (-1.936) (-3.263)  (-2.479)  (-1.915) 
Multiple issuer dummy  -12.571  -57.452 -14.090  -19.298  -3.461 
  (-1.746) (-2.947) (-1.846)  (-1.914)  (-1.902) 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.598 0.597 0.509  0.374  0.318 
No. of observations  3,567  1,859  1,708  3,077  490   38
Table 4: Bond at-issue yield spreads and location – robustness tests 
 
This table estimates coefficients from regressing corporate yield spreads on location dummies (a Rural 
dummy, for firms located at least 100 miles away from metropolitan areas of at least 1 million people; 
and a Small city dummy, for firms that are not rural or urban), and various control variables. Urban firms 
are defined as located in the metropolitan area of New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, 
San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, or Houston. Control variables include Moody’s 
rating (Rating), bond time to maturity in years (Time to maturity), issue size estimated by the issue 
proceeds standardized by firm asset size (Size), return on assets in % (ROA), leverage in % (Leverage), a 
high-yield dummy (High Yield) to denote firms with non-investment grade debt (below Baa3), a bond 
prestigious underwriter dummy to denote bonds underwritten prestigious underwriters (Prestigious 
underwriter dummy), a Nasdaq dummy (Nasdaq dummy) to denote firms listed on Nasdaq, the logarithm 
of the number of analysts covering the issuing firm (Log(1+Analysts)), a multiple issuer dummy 
(Multiple issuer) for bonds issued more than once over the sample period, and year and industry dummies 
(not reported). The data covers the period 1990-2004, with 3,567 bond issues, from which 493 belong to 
rural firms, 1,301 to small city firms, and 1,773 to urban companies. Columns (1) and (2) segment the 
data into Nasdaq and non-Nasdaq listed firms. Columns (3) and (4) divide the sample into firms that have 
only a single bond issuance (One-time issuers) vs. firms that have issued bonds more than once (Multiple 
issuers) throughout the sample period. In column (5) we run the primary regression on a sample of utility 
firms (SIC 4900-4999). Columns (6) and (7) run our primary specification using alternative definitions 
for urban firms: firms located in New York City, or firms located in one of the five largest U.S. cities 
(New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington- Baltimore and San Francisco). White’s 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 














Intercept  326.860  254.044  278.729 235.113 330.740 123.846  125.468 
  (2.991)  (16.216)  (5.779) (15.078) (2.258)  (7.692)  (7.991) 
Rural  dummy  34.621  13.862  31.922 13.502 32.316 20.369  19.465 
  (1.862)  (2.217)  (1.697) (2.214) (1.788) (2.513)  (2.526) 
Small city dummy  16.232  5.213  11.812  6.364  21.212  9.906  9.101 
  (1.901)  (1.936)  (1.935) (1.891) (1.863) (1.881)  (1.776) 
Size  -3.673  -1.282  -3.284 -1.211 -0.295 -5.003  -5.021 
  (-1.812)  (-1.813)  (-1.868) (-2.861) (-1.761) (-5.081)  (-5.513) 
ROA  -1.745  -1.622  -4.156 -4.454 -7.314 -1.296  -1.822 
  (-2.465)  (-2.351)  (-2.619) (-1.764) (-2.334) (-1.893)  (-1.829) 
Leverage  41.682  43.183  48.210 36.727 27.917 47.608  44.992 
  (3.283)  (2.465)  (1.974) (2.384) (3.250) (6.287)  (5.572) 
Rating -25.095  -14.250  -15.913  -13.777 -11.211 -13.289  -13.850 
 (-2.266)  (-12.958)  (-3.901)  (-11.413)  (-8.458)  (-10.454)  (-11.748) 
Time  to  maturity  3.895  2.148  1.890 1.187 1.499 0.443  0.378 
  (2.353)  (1.512)  (1.972) (0.958) (1.655) (1.387)  (1.465) 
High  yield  dummy  72.009  98.569  122.120 76.099 160.446 78.441  60.711 
  (2.476)  (9.336)  (4.383) (6.732) (6.636) (6.755)  (5.537) 
Prestigious underwriter 
dummy 
-5.409  -14.994  -36.764 -14.144 -10.287 -15.563  -18.511 
  (-1.691)  (-2.718)  (-2.017) (-2.558) (-3.236) (-2.504)  (-3.215) 
Nasdaq  dummy      20.460  10.930 9.924 17.186  16.013 
      (2.147) (1.747) (1.476) (1.740)  (1.629) 
Log(1+Analysts) -25.466  -12.846  -28.837 -10.374 -21.392 -12.464  -10.656 
  (-2.353)  (-2.461)  (-3.253) (-2.455) (-2.376) (-2.364)  (-2.013) 
Multiple issuer dummy  -6.516  -19.009     -14.360  -25.310 -28.111 
 (-1.952)  (-2.457)      (-1.926)  (-3.110)  (-3.558) 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.620  0.507  0.434 0.589 0.484 0.573  0.576 
No. of observations  1,420  2,147  472  3,095  465  1,962  2,209   39
Table 5: The impact of information flow on the relation between location and the cost of debt 
capital 
 
This table estimates coefficients from regressing corporate yield spreads on location dummies (a Rural 
dummy, for firms located at least 100 miles away from metropolitan areas of at least 1 million people; 
and a Small city dummy, for firms that are not rural or urban), and various control variables. Urban firms 
are defined as located in the metropolitan area of New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, 
San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, or Houston. Control variables include Moody’s 
rating (Rating), bond time to maturity in years (Time to maturity), issue size estimated by the issue 
proceeds standardized by firm asset size (Size), return on assets in % (ROA), leverage in % (Leverage), a 
high-yield dummy (High Yield) to denote firms with non-investment grade debt (below Baa3), a bond 
prestigious underwriter dummy to denote bonds underwritten prestigious underwriters (Prestigious 
underwriter dummy), a Nasdaq dummy (Nasdaq dummy) to denote firms listed on Nasdaq, the logarithm 
of the number of analysts covering the issuing firm (Log(1+Analysts)), a multiple issuer dummy 
(Multiple issuer) for bonds issued more than once over the sample period, and year and industry dummies 
(not reported). The data covers the period 1990-2004, with 3,567 bond issues, from which 493 belong to 
rural firms, 1,301 to small city firms, and 1,773 to urban companies. Columns (1) and (2) segment the 
data into firms with and without analyst coverage, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) divide the sample 
into small firms with or without analyst coverage, respectively, and columns (5) and (6) look at large 






























Intercept 233.652  354.846  336.411  385.902  187.374  284.906 
 (4.025)  (3.454)  (3.474)  (4.039)  (5.363)  (4.661) 
Rural dummy  18.429  24.214  22.454  47.575  8.631  12.464 
 (2.128)  (2.105)  (2.473)  (4.660)  (3.935)  (4.686) 
Small city dummy  2.411  13.431  3.464  21.374  1.363  8.571 
 (1.696)  (1.965)  (1.745)  (2.115)  (1.996)  (1.767) 
Size -1.563  -6.374  -1.856  -3.570  -1.274  -2.351 
 (-1.953)  (-3.436)  (-1.769)  (-2.351)  (-2.846)  (-1.895) 
ROA -2.174  -3.626  -4.575  -7.365  -1.346  -3.647 
 (-3.455)  (-2.131)  (-2.352)  (-1.967)  (-2.142)  (-3.012) 
Leverage 38.099  79.155  47.365  51.124  19.731  22.745 
 (1.987)  (1.769)  (2.749)  (3.909)  (1.738)  (2.846) 
Rating -11.952  -20.939  -15.644  -19.094  -7.867  -9.036 
 (-9.672)  (-6.282)  (-8.757)  (-8.026)  (-10.756)  (-10.254) 
Time to maturity  0.542  1.436  1.220  2.721  0.374  0.935 
 (1.908)  (1.706)  (2.016)  (2.001)  (1.957)  (2.936) 
High yield dummy  80.984  91.364  120.263  136.721  58.464  61.361 
 (10.737)  (9.341)  (12.376)  (11.283)  (8.364)  (3.502) 
Prestigious underwriter 
dummy 
-3.253 -5.464  -2.346  -4.252  -3.182  -3.559 
 (-1.937)  (-2.011)  (-3.260)  (-2.116)  (-1.660)  (-1.716) 
Nasdaq dummy  5.086  18.210  8.353  9.027  3.263  5.363 
 (0.437)  (2.373)  (1.956)  (2.001)  (0.258)  (1.908) 
Multiple issuer dummy  -22.959  -23.877 -27.363  -32.027  -16.270 -19.273 
 (-2.889)  (-2.881)  (-3.263)  (-3.265)  (-1.895)  (-1.896) 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.548 0.546  0.668  0.663  0.671  0.673 
No. of observations  220  3,347  220  1,708  220  1,859   40
Table 6: At-issue yield spreads and governance quality  
 
This table presents the mean and median at-issue yield spreads associated with four different groups of 
firms formed on the basis of governance quality and geographic location. Good governance equals 1 if a 
firm’s Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) six-measure entrenchment index (BCF index) is below the 
median BCF index of all the sample firms within each year; 0 if otherwise. Bad governance equals 1 if a 
firm’s BCF index is above or equal to the median BCF index of all the sample firms within each year; 0 if 
otherwise. Urban firms are defined as firms that have their headquarters located in the metropolitan area 
of New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, 
Dallas, or Houston. Rural companies are those located at least 100 miles away from the center of a 
metropolitan area of at least 1 million people, as defined by the 2000 census. Small city firms are defined 
as those that are not urban or rural. We use a standard two-tailed t-test for differences in means and a 








































 N=90 N=315 N=437      
Good governance  152.222  144.841  134.362  2.562  3.016  2.863 
 [141.327]  [132.986] [122.893] [2.274]  [3.161]  [2.715] 
            
 N=179 N=360 N=351      
Bad governance  171.983  160.808  145.173  2.901  3.862  2.996 
 [166.920]  [155.081] [137.063] [2.913]  [4.014]  [3.018] 
            
T-Statistic for  -3.211  -3.158  -2.764       
differences in Means             
            
Wilcoxon Singed-Rank Z  [-3.891]  [-3.686]  [-2.851]       
Statistic for differences in 
Medians 
           41
Table 7: The impact of governance quality on the relation between location and the cost of debt 
capital 
 
This table reports regressions of bond at-issue yield spreads on governance quality for the period 1990 to 
2004. The variable BCF index is the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) six-measure entrenchment index, 
based on IRRC. The interaction terms in column 3 are constructed by interacting governance quality 
(good or bad) with the dummy of geographic location (Rural or Small city). Good governance equals 1 if 
a firm’s BCF index is below the median BCF index of all the sample firms within each year; 0 if 
otherwise. Bad governance equals 1 if a firm’s BCF index is above or equal to the median BCF index of 
all the sample firms within each year; 0 if otherwise. Control variables are as defined in Table 3. The data 
covers the period 1990-2004, with 1,732 bond issues, for which the BCF index data exists. White’s 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 329.809 381.050 412.352 
  (3.805) (3.930) (3.963) 
BCF index  8.409  7.471   
 (3.253)  (3.102)   
Rural dummy    17.400   
   (2.610)  
Small city dummy     5.844   
   (2.103)  
Good governance*Rural      10.227 
     (2.856) 
Bad governance*Rural      25.987 
     (2.467) 
Good governance*Small city      3.362 
     (2.381) 
Bad governance*Small city      9.840 
     (1.932) 
Size  -4.040 -3.766 -3.747 
 (-3.986) (-3.691) (-3.693) 
ROA  -2.304 -2.269 -2.251 
 (-0.379) (-1.968) (-1.950) 
Leverage  35.375 36.943 36.369 
  (3.898) (3.981) (4.114) 
Rating  -13.594 -13.911 -14.105 
 (-9.472) (-9.668) (-9.974) 
Time  to  maturity  0.974 0.882 0.890 
  (3.140) (2.830) (2.851) 
High yield dummy  104.887 105.553 104.410 
  (7.759) (7.838) (7.757) 
Prestigious underwriter 
dummy 
-10.677 -11.543 -11.124 
 (1.703)  (-1.835) (-1.761) 
Nasdaq  dummy  23.496 26.973 26.574 
  (1.749) (1.839) (1.761) 
Log(1+Analysts)  -18.454 -17.355 -17.570 
 (-2.017) (-1.981) (-1.892) 
Multiple issuer dummy  -4.808  -5.912  -5.661 
 (-1.447) (-1.699) (-1.751) 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.482 0.486 0.486 
No. of observations  1,732  1,732  1,732 
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Table 8: Private vs. public debt summary statistics 
 
Summary statistics of the characteristics for 3,567 publicly traded and 759 private placement bonds, from 
which 292 are non-144A and 467 are 144A private placement bonds. Data was collected from Securities 
Data Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues database, for 1990-2004. The variables include: the bond yield 
spread in basis points (Spread), the amount issued in mil $ (Issue proceeds), Moody’s rating (Rating), 
bond time to maturity in years (Time to Maturity), firm’s asset size in billions $ (Assets), return on assets 
in % (ROA), the firm’s leverage (Leverage), the percentage of speculative bond issues with rating below 
Baa3 (High yield issues), and the percentage of high yield bonds (High Yield), denoting non-investment 














                                                 
a Indicates significant difference at least at the 10% level between private placement and publicly offered bonds. 
b Indicates significant difference at least at the 10% level between the sub-samples of non-144A and 144A of private 
placement bonds.  
c Only for public and 144A bond issues.  
  Private Placement Bonds 













 (119.90)  (129.36)  (113.98)  (100.50) 
        




 (101.91)  (25.00)  (150.00)  (152.37) 
        
Rating 
c 12.14 
a N.  A.  12.14 
a 10.18 
a 
 (13.26)    (13.26)  (11.00) 
        
Time to maturity (in years)  10.810  11.961 
b 10.094 
b 9.91 
 (10.01)  (9.81)  (10.14)  (10.05) 
        





 (1.33)  (1.29)  (1.35)  (4.60) 
        
ROA  7.13%   6.03%   7.80%   7.12
a 
 (4.47%)  (4.96%)  (4.17%)  (6.69%) 






 (29.37%)  (8.33)  (42.52%)  (8.94) 
        
High yield issues 
c 79.66% 
a N.  A.  79.66% 
a 13.73% 
a 
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Table 9: Comparison of spread means across rating categories – private vs. public debt 
 
This table compares between the mean at-issue yield spreads of private placements (only 144A issues) 
and public bonds across headquarters location and Moody’s rating categories. Moody’s rating categories 
segment the data into low risk, high to upper-medium quality bonds (Aaa-A3), moderate risk, medium 



















   144A  Private  Placements 
(n=460) 

















   N=4 N=11 N=20 N=18 N=48 N=344 
Investment   Aaa-A3  83.44  67.28  60.69  95.22  76.44  71.43 
Grade            
   N=5 N=13 N=36 N=436 N=1,084 N=1,148 
  Baa1-Baa3  125.01 110.29 99.33 163.14 152.38  147.59 
              
              
Speculative   N=28 N=74 N=269 N=39 N=169 N=281 
Grade Ba1-B3  396.91  379.83  361.17  223.58  201.37  199.25   44
Table 10: Private debt at-issue yield spreads and location  
 
This table estimates coefficients from regressing 144A private placement at-issue yield spreads on the 
Rural and Small city location dummies and various control variables. Data includes a sample of 467 
private bond issues during 1990-2004. Control variables include: issue size standardized by its assets 
(Size), profitability (ROA), Moody’s credit ratings (Rating), leverage (Leverage), time to maturity (Time 
to maturity), a high yield dummy to denote speculative bond issues (High yield dummy), and a Multiple 
issuer dummy, to denote firms that have issued bonds more than once throughout the sample period. 
Columns (1) provides the primary regression based on the private placement sample. Column (2) looks at 
small firms, based on the median asset size of the firm’s in our data. Column (3) presents the primary 
regression on a sub sample of firms with highly entrenched managers (badly governed firms), for which 
the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) entrenchment index (BCF index) is above or equal to the median 
BCF index of all the sample firms within each year. In column (4) we look at a sub sample of highly 
levered firms, with a leverage level above or equal to the sample’s median. Column (5) presents the 
primary regression on a sub sample of speculative bond issues, and column (6) presents the results on a 
sub sample of firms that issued private placement bonds only once throughout the sample period. Control 





















Intercept 221.890  256.752  243.598  234.576  258.461  241.302 
 (8.657)  (4.586)  (8.364)  (4.565)  (5.576)  (9.406) 
Rural dummy  2.808  4.027  3.765  4.670  5.056  3.027 
 (1.228)  (1.419)  (1.332)  (1.229)  (1.611)  (1.384) 
Small city dummy  0.863  1.464  1.014  0.952  2.469  0.984 
 (1.117)  (1.157)  (1.156)  (1.284)  (1.486)  (1.392) 
Size -1.374  -1.537  -1.429  -1.594  -1.641  -1.771 
 (-1.773)  (-1.896)  (-1.873)  (-1.946)  (-1.997)  (-2.026) 
ROA -1.352  -1.464  -1.424  -1.463  -1.467  -1.480 
 (-2.116)  (-2.213)  (-2.386)  (-2.119)  (-2.186)  (-2.402) 
Leverage 14.319  18.745  17.382  15.373  17.370  14.942 
 (3.587)  (3.904)  (3.209)  (3.907)  (3.967)  (3.856) 
Rating -8.371  -10.365  -9.476  -9.361  -10.471  -9.465 
 (-3.092)  (-3.772)  (-3.221)  (-3.198)  (-3.576)  (-3.286) 
Time to maturity  3.754  3.901  4.013  4.046  4.569  3.895 
 (2.964)  (3.114)  (2.986)  (3.056)  (3.214)  (2.969) 
High yield dummy  46.014  58.940  47.397  48.576    46.037 
 (1.976)  (2.016)  (2.972)  (2.885)    (1.994) 
Multiple issuer dummy  -8.947  -12.475  -9.460  -9.679  -9.318   
 (-1.931)  (-1.996)  (-1.994)  (-1.997)  (-2.005)   
Adjusted 
2 R  0.481  0.457  0.452  0.452  0.478  0.480 
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Table 11: The impact of regulation on the relation between location and the cost of public debt 
capital 
 
This table estimates coefficients from regressing corporate yield spreads on location dummies (a Rural dummy, 
for firms located at least 100 miles away from metropolitan areas of at least 1 million people; and a Small city 
dummy, for firms that are not rural or urban), and various control variables. Urban firms are defined as located in 
the metropolitan area of New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco, Philadelphia, 
Boston, Detroit, Dallas, or Houston. Control variables include Moody’s rating (Rating), bond time to maturity in 
years (Time to maturity), issue size estimated by the issue proceeds standardized by firm asset size (Size), return 
on assets in % (ROA), leverage in % (Leverage), a high-yield dummy (High Yield) to denote firms with non-
investment grade debt (below Baa3), a bond prestigious underwriter dummy to denote bonds underwritten by 
prestigious underwriters (Prestigious underwriter dummy), a Nasdaq dummy (Nasdaq dummy) to denote firms 
listed on Nasdaq, the logarithm of the number of analysts covering the issuing firm (Log(1+Analysts)), a multiple 
issuer dummy (Multiple issuer) for bonds issued more than once over the sample period, and year and industry 
dummies (not reported). The data covers the period 1990-2004, with 3,567 bond issues, from which 493 belong to 
rural firms, 1,301 to small city firms, and 1,773 to urban companies. Columns (1) and (2) segment the data into 
before and after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 2002, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) look at small 
firms before and after SOX, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) present the results for firms in which the Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2005) entrenchment index (BCF index) is above or equal to the median BCF index of all the 
sample firms within each year, before and after SOX, respectively. White’s heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics 
are in parentheses. 
 




















Intercept  214.859 267.210 339.461 253.480 262.404 269.509 
  (4.680) (2.376) (3.946) (3.265) (3.013) (3.394) 
Rural  dummy  26.205  8.363  64.920 10.013 28.018  9.575 
  (2.673) (1.517) (2.979) (1.515) (3.003) (1.411) 
Small  city  dummy  11.977 4.390 14.243 6.116 14.977 6.484 
  (1.790) (1.550) (2.016) (1.452) (2.298) (1.365) 
Size  -2.784 -2.746 -3.253 -2.153 -3.630 -3.735 
  (-2.863) (-2.793) (-2.846) (-2.113) (-3.801) (-3.837) 
ROA  -1.385 -1.472 -1.353 -1.635 -1.308 -1.369 
  (-2.313) (-2.361) (-2.331) (-2.485) (-2.128) (-2.360) 
Leverage  27.526 18.368 51.226 32.830 39.038 22.464 
  (2.781) (2.832) (2.937) (2.110) (3.206) (2.053) 
Rating  -12.940 -12.353 -18.272 -11.319 -15.213 -13.261 
  (-7.157) (-2.463) (-2.374) (-2.093) (-6.953) (-1.952) 
Time  to  maturity  0.706 0.757 0.826 0.637 1.416 0.926 
  (2.588) (2.589) (2.469) (2.902) (3.501) (2.787) 
High  yield  dummy  101.959 45.378 143.474 98.742 196.245 88.387 
 (10.243)  (4.283)  (12.746)  (6.376)  (9.675)  (4.364) 
Prestigious underwriter 
dummy 
-16.365 -15.340 -42.353 -19.390 -15.198 -16.273 
  (-3.075) (-3.086) (-3.273) (-3.291) (-2.437) (-2.975) 
Nasdaq  dummy  13.963  13.374  31.292 9.373 14.006  14.363 
  (1.398) (1.793) (1.792) (1.811) (1.931) (1.923) 
Log(1+Analysts) -23.464  -22.001  -41.380 -18.264 -25.283 -24.364 
  (-2.351) (-2.369) (-2.902) (-2.778) (-2.192) (-2.162) 
Multiple issuer dummy  -25.012  -8.363 -37.387 -7.376 -29.946  -14.273 
  (-3.428) (-3.465) (-3.273) (-3.370) (-3.798) (-3.263) 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.535 0.532 0.635 0.631 0.405 0.384 
No. of observations  2,527  1,040  1,139  569  612  278   46
Table 12: Shareholder reaction to bond issuance before and after SOX, by location 
 
Panel A shows the cumulative mean abnormal returns (in %) for a value-weighted portfolio of 579 bond 
issues over a [-1,1] day period relative to the bond issuance announcement date. Cumulative mean 
abnormal returns are compared across geographic locations, with the corresponding t-statistic in 
parentheses. Panel B shows the cumulative mean abnormal returns (in %) for a value-weighted portfolio 
of 324 bond issues of small firms over the [-1,1] day period relative to the bond issuance announcement 
date. Small firms are selected if their asset size is below that of the full sample’s median. The issuance 
announcement date is the bond filing date with the SEC. a company is located in an urban area if its 
headquarters is in the metropolitan area of New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San 
Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, or Houston. Rural companies are those located at least 
100 miles away from the center of a metropolitan area of at least 1 million people, as defined by the 2000 
census. Small city firms are defined as those that are not urban or rural. 
 
 
Panel A: Full sample (N=579) 
  Rural firms   Small city firms   Urban firms  
 N=46 N=117 N=174 
Pre SOX  0.298%  -0.074%  -0.389% 
 (0.977)  (-0.420)  (-0.983) 
      
 N=23 N=73 N=146 
Post SOX  0.003%  -0.018%  -0.034% 
 (0.136)  (-1.253)  (-1.335) 
 
Panel B: Small firms (N=324) 
  Rural firms   Small city firms   Urban firms  
 N=31 N=75 N=98 
Pre SOX  0.841%  -0.361%  -0.624% 
 (1.698)  (-1.220)  (-0.253) 
      
 N=18 N=42 N=60 
Post SOX  0.008%  -0.218%  0.000% 
 (0.253)  (-1.253)  (1.138) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 